

Near Field Communication  
Research Lab  
Hagenberg



University of Applied Sciences


# NFC Devices: Security & Privacy

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## NFC - What is it all about ...


- RFID Derivate 13,56 Mhz
- Integrated in mobile devices for consumer market
- Operating Modes
  - Tag Emulation (PICC)
  - Reader/Writer (PCD)
  - Peer (NFC)
- Range: 0 – 10 cm (proximity Technology)



# NFC vs. RFID

Near Field  
Communication

Radio Frequency  
Identification



## NFC Device *Operating Modes*

- Data exchange (P2P – NFC peer-to-peer)
  - Bidirectional connection to exchange data between devices
  - WiFi, BT, P2P Payment, Contacts, vCards, ...
- Reader/Writer mode (PCD – Proximity Coupling Device)
  - Mobile Device is able to read external tags/smartcards
  - SmartPoster, WiFi Config, Ring-Tones, ...
- Tag emulation (PICC – Proximity Card)
  - Reader can't distinguish between smartcard & tag emulation
  - Handset could contain multiple smartcards (smartcard chips)


## Goal of Paper: NFC Threat Model

- Define Setup/Architecture
- Define Use cases
- Derive Assumptions
- Look at Interfaces to be attacked
- Clarify Trust Level of Components
- Assets to be protected
- Compose Threat Model
- Conclusion: Propose Counter Measures



# Setup/Architecture & Use cases

- Platform: Handset
- Modes
  - Identification Mode
  - Tag Emulation (SE extern)
  - Wired Mode (SE intern)
  - P2P Mode
  - R/W Mode




# Use Cases

<i>Communication Flow</i>	<i>Operation Mode</i>	<i>Communication Interface</i>	<i>Use case</i>
(1) Use of unique ID Handset providing data Reader collecting data	– Tag Emulation Read/Write	ISO14443	Access Loyalty
(2) External mode of secure element Handset providing data Reader collecting data	– Tag Emulation Read/Write	ISO14443	Access Loyalty Payment
(3) Handset reads external tag Tag holding data Handset reading tag/target	– tag (emulation) Read/Write	ISO14443	BT/WiFi-Config VCard transfer SmartPoster
(4) Data exchange using NFC NFC target providing data Handset collecting data	– Peer (Target) Peer (Init)	ISO18092	BT/WiFi-Config VCard transfer data exchange
(5) Internal mode of secure element Secure elements in the handset Host Controller Application	– Internal mode Comm. channel to SE	ISO7816	OTA provisioning Ticket upload Money top up

# Assumptions & Interfaces to be attacked

- Handset allows baseband connection
- Firmware in NFC chip can't be modified
- Secure Element is secure (attacking of interfaces possible)
- Multiple Secure Elements possible






## Trust Level & Assessts

- Host Controller: untrusted
  - RF interface: untrusted
  - SE: trusted, but interface itself not. (SWP, S2C)
1. user's privacy
  2. handset functionality causing cost (e.g. air time)
  3. data stored in the mobile device (e.g. bluetooth address, contacts, short messages)
  4. applications (and linked functionality; e.g. payment) and data stored in the secure elements/tags
  5. NFC/RFID functionality of the handset

# NFC Threat Model Matrix

- Use cases
- Attack Scenarios
  - Eavesdropping
  - Man-in-the Middle
  - Relay/Replay
  - Skimming
  - Phishing
  - Brute Force
- Components
- Assets to be protected



## Proposed Counter Measures

- No ID based Services
- Button for NFC (on/off)
- No battery off mode (but NFC flight mode)
- No application index in SE without (mutual) authentication
- Managing in-device security (certificate based)
- Integrate Security Layer in NFC IP1

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**Happy to answer any questions**

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# NFC Threat Model Matrix

Use case Components	(1)	(2)		(3)			(4)		(5)	
	ID	SE	RF <sup>4</sup>	Device	Tag	RF	Device	RF	SE	OTA
<i>Spoofing</i>	Man-in-the-Middle	1				2, 3		2, 3		4
	Skimming	1				1		1	1	1
	Relay	1		4			2, 3		2, 3	1
	Replay	1					2, 3		2, 3	4
	Eavesdropping	1					2, 3		2, 3	4
<i>Tampering</i>	Brute Force		4		4		3		4	
<i>Repudiation</i>	Application driven		4						4	
<i>Information disclosure</i>	Tracking/Tracing	1	1		1				1	
	Eavesdropping	1				3		3		4
	Phishing				2			2		
<i>DoS</i>	(Blocker) Tags		4, 5		5			5		
	Application driven		4, 5		5			5	4, 5	
<i>Elevation of Privilege</i>	Application driven				5			5	4, 5	